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Executive summary
In order to accelerate the infrastructure investments that 
are important for the achievement of the EU energy policy 
objectives, the European Commission has proposed an 
Energy Infrastructure package. The package includes a 
new Regulation on guidelines for trans­European energy 
infrastructure (EC, 2011a) (hereafter “the Regulation”) 
on which a political agreement between the European 
Parliament and the Council has recently been reached. 
The Regulation requires the development of Cost­
Benefit Analysis (CBA) methods (one for electricity, 
and one for gas) to facilitate the selection of Projects of 
Common Interest (PCI). In this report, we concentrate 
on electricity infrastructure (transmission and storage).
Chapter 1 defines the scope of the CBA. We first 
discuss the PCI selection process in the context of the 
Regulation, as it preconditions the way that the CBA 
method can be conceived. Then, we discuss the issues 
regarding project and baseline definition, as well as the 
distributional effects that these projects typically have. 
Next, the chapter maps the possibly relevant costs and 
benefits, proposing a reduced list of effects that should 
be used for all projects. We nonetheless recognize that 
there might be other effects that need to be considered 
for specific projects, and thus the chapter identifies 
indicators that can be used to detect these specific 
projects.
Chapter 2 is dedicated to the calculation of the net 
benefit of a project, starting from the CBA scope defined 
in Chapter 1. We first propose how the most relevant 
effects can be monetized, i.e. which inputs and model 
to use. We then discuss how the monetized effects 
can be discounted to the present, arguing that a single 
discount rate should be used for all projects. Finally, the 
chapter considers uncertainty, and proposes a stochastic 
approach that is consistent with the scenarios of the 
Energy Roadmap 2050. This would then imply that a net 
benefit distribution is calculated for each project.
Chapter 3 concentrates on how to rank projects based 
on a net benefit distribution that has been calculated 
following Chapter 2. We argue that the initial ranking of 
projects should be done based on the mean value of their 
net benefit distribution. This ranking might need to be 
adjusted for uncertainties and for competitive projects.  
Chapter 4 observes that the methodological implications 
of using CBA for cost allocation are limited. Therefore, 
the method recommended for ranking projects in this 
report could also be used as a basis for cost allocation. 
The only additional requirement is that the output 
should be disaggregated per TSO area. Note however 
that this report does not enter into the discussion of how 
the CBA method should be used for cost allocation.
The report concludes with the following 
recommendations: (1) interaction between projects 
must be taken into account in the project and baseline 
definition; (2) data consistency and quality should 
be ensured; (3) the conventional time horizon is 20­
25 years; (4) CBA should concentrate on a reduced 
list of effects and those should be monetized; (5) 
distributional concerns should not be addressed in the 
calculation of net benefits; (6) infrastructure costs need 
to be disaggregated; (7) the model used to monetize the 
production cost savings and gross consumer surplus 
needs to be explicitly stated; (8) a common discount 
factor should be used for all projects; (9) a stochastic 
approach that is consistent with the Energy Roadmap 
2050 should be used to address uncertainty; (10) the 
ranking should be primarily based on the monetized 
net benefit.
Throughout the report, we discuss to what extent the 
draft CBA method proposed by ENTSO­E (2012a) is 
already in line with these recommendations.
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Introduction
Why an Energy Infrastructure Package?
The European Commission has recently estimated 
the investment needs in energy (electricity and gas) 
infrastructure of European importance to be about 
€200 billion up to 20201. The Commission has also 
stressed that, under a business as usual scenario, 
almost half of these investments are at risk of not being 
delivered in time or at all, leaving a gap of about €100 
billion (EC, 2011b). The main identified obstacles are 
problems related to permit granting, regulatory issues 
and financing; and those cannot be fully overcome by 
the recently introduced measures, such as the Ten 
Year Network Development Plan (TYNDP).
In this context, the European Commission has 
proposed an Energy Infrastructure package that 
includes a new Regulation on guidelines for trans­
European energy infrastructure (EC, 2011a) 
(hereafter “the Regulation”) on which a political 
agreement between the European Parliament and the 
Council has recently been reached. The Regulation 
establishes a process to identify Projects of Common 
Interest (PCIs) in priority corridors and areas2. 
Projects under this label will have a facilitated permit 
granting process and enhanced regulatory treatment. 
The proposed Connecting Europe Facility sets aside a 
€9 billion budget for energy infrastructure projects to 
provide EU financial assistance for both studies and 
1  Energy infrastructure categories are specified in An­
nex II of the Regulation on guidelines for trans­European energy 
infrastructure. Production assets are not considered as infra­
structure. 
2  The priority electricity corridors include Northern Sea 
offshore grid, North­South electricity interconnections in West­
ern Europe, North­South electricity interconnections in Central 
Eastern and South Eastern Europe, and the Baltic Energy Market 
Interconnection Plan in electricity. 
implementation of projects that are not commercially 
viable.
It should be noted that the PCIs can be commercially 
viable, which is why having the label, according to 
the Regulation, does not necessarily lead to financial 
assistance. The selection of PCIs and provision of 
financial assistance are then two separate processes. 
Note also that not only EU TSOs, but also third parties, 
including both TSOs from neighboring countries and 
other relevant stakeholders, can propose projects to 
the Regional Groups3 to be labeled as PCIs, while the 
final list is established by the European Commission.
Why CBA in this package? 
Previous energy infrastructure policies at EU 
level have been made based on a list of priority 
projects that resulted from negotiation between EU 
institutions and Member States. In order to facilitate 
the selection of PCIs, the Regulation instead asks for 
the development of a cost­benefit analysis (CBA) 
method.
The proposal includes a procedure (Article 12) and 
terms of reference (Annexes IV and V), providing 
common guidelines to design a CBA method. The 
procedure is that the ENTSOs propose the method; 
ACER, the European Commission and Member States 
will give their opinion; the ENTSOs will review the 
methods taking into account the opinions provided; 
3  Regional Groups will be established by the Regulation 
based on each priority corridor and area and their respective geo­
graphical coverage. For electricity infrastructure projects, each 
Group shall be composed of representatives of the Member States, 
National Regulatory Authorities, Transmission System Operators 
and project promoters for each of the relevant priorities, as well 
as the EC, ACER and ENTSO­E; while the decision making pow­
ers in the Groups shall be restricted to Member States and the EC 
only.
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and finally the European Commission will approve 
it. This method will be used by the Regional Groups 
in their assessment and proposition of candidate 
projects.
Why a THINK report on this topic?
The Regulation requires the development of a CBA 
method for electricity and gas infrastructure.4
The aim of this report is to support the European 
Commission, as well as the other concerned entities 
(ENTSO­E and ACER), in the development of the 
CBA method to be used for electricity infrastructure 
projects, including transmission and storage projects. 
Thus, this report provides recommendations on how 
to implement an appropriate CBA for electricity 
infrastructure projects.
CBA is more than a concept of comparing costs 
with benefits. Many choices need to be made when 
developing such a method in this context. Throughout 
the report, we discuss to what extent the draft CBA 
method proposed by ENTSO­E (2012a) is already 
in line with what we recommend. This allows us to 
conclude the report with our main recommendations 
for the improvement of the ENTSO­E draft method.
4  The Joint Research Centre, in collaboration with DG 
Energy, has recently released guidelines for the development of 
a cost­benefit analysis for smart­grid projects (JRC, 2012). Note 
that the development of such a method for smart grid projects 
was foreseen by the third package.
 Structure of the report
In this report, we first present the scope of the CBA 
(Chapter 1) and how to calculate the net benefit 
(Chapter 2). Afterwards, we discuss how to use the 
CBA output to compare and rank projects (Chapter 3), 
and last, we present the methodological implications 
of using CBA for cost allocation (Chapter 4).
http://think.eui.eu 3
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1. Scope of the CBA
This chapter starts with Section 1.1 discussing 
the methodological implications of the process of 
selecting Projects of Common Interest. The process 
specifies the order of selecting steps, the responsible 
actors and their tasks. This process could precondition 
the way that the CBA method is conceived, including 
the scoping of the CBA. Therefore, the awareness 
of the methodological implication of the process 
is a prerequisite to discuss the choices to be made 
regarding project definition (Section 1.2), baseline 
definition (Section 1.3), effect mapping (Section 1.4) 
and distributional effects (Section 1.5).
1.1 Methodological implication of the 
process
The process of selecting Projects of Common Interest 
consists of 6 steps, as illustrated in Figure 1. In what 
follows, we discuss the implication of this process for 
the CBA method. 
First, the fact that the project promoters submit 
projects together with a CBA implies that each project 
is evaluated individually, not as a group. This means 
that the way projects will be evaluated in this context 
is different from transmission planning (Box 1). A 
shortcoming of an individual evaluation is that this 
approach might not fully take into account interactions 
between infrastructure projects in network industries. 
As a result, selecting projects based on individual 
evaluation results might not necessarily lead to the 
optimal set of projects. However, one should notice 
that this is not a feature of the CBA method per se, 
but rather due to the decentralized process of project 
proposition and evaluation. This shortcoming of the 
individual evaluation approach can be remedied, at 
least partly, by considering the interactions between 
projects in the project definition (Section 1.2) and 
baseline definition (Section 1.3). 
Second, the fact that projects are ranked within the 
region has two implications. First, there should be a 
minimum of harmonization, at least at the regional 
level, in terms of definition of scope (Chapter 1) and 
the method to calculate the net benefit (Chapter 2). 
Also, consensus must be achieved at the regional level 
on how to consider in the ranking the factors that 
have not been included in the calculation of the net 
benefit (Chapter 3). 
Third, the elaboration of a Union­wide list of Projects 
of Common Interest without ranking implies that 
the European Commission would draw a line in 
the lists submitted by the Regional Groups. Indeed, 
as the Projects of Common Interest will receive the 
Figure 1: Process of selection (Nyitrai, 2012; Sikow-Magny, 2012)
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same priority treatment – the accelerated permit 
granting process ­ there is no need to do the ranking 
at the European level. Distributive concerns (as will 
be discussed in Section 1.5) might play a role in 
producing a balanced list of Projects of Common 
Interest over all regions. Moreover, this list is to be 
updated every two years. This implies that the CBA is 
applied every two years to evaluate both the projects 
which have received the PCI label and those applying 
for it. 
Box 1:  Electricity transmission planning
Transmission planning refers to the process of finding the investments required to achieve a reliable and 
economically efficient network in the face of an uncertain future. The aim of transmission planning is then to 
achieve or select the optimal set of investments.
Current practices are diverse, not only in terms of time frame but also regarding the geographical scope, which is 
also related to regulatory framework (see table below). Moreover, there are different planning models, where we 
can distinguish two main groups: mathematical optimization models (techniques that find an optimum expansion 
plan by using a calculation procedure that solves a mathematical formulation of the problem); and heuristic 
models (techniques that go step-by-step generating, evaluating, and selecting expansion options, with or without 
the user’s help) (Pérez-Arriaga et al. 1987). For a more recent overview of transmission planning methods see 
Latorre et al. (2003), Realisegrid (2009) and MIT (2011).
Entity(ies) 
responsible
Time horizon CBA as a tool Uncertainty
California ISO 10 years Yes Multi-scenario




5-20 years Yes Multi-scenario
UK SO and TOs 7 years Limited Monte Carlo 
method
Main sources: CAISO (2004); Nordel (2007); Barquín (2008); National Grid (2011); Brattle Group (2007)
The need for planning over larger areas has been increasing, due to the development of an EU internal market and 
due to the integration of large shares of renewable sources in the system. The Ten Year Network Development Plan 
is a first step towards community-wide transmission planning. The cost benefit analysis that will  be developed in 
the context of the Energy Infrastructure Package will also be used for the Ten Year Network Development Plan. 
Indeed, the same method could be used for the joint assessment of different combinations of projects in search 
of an optimal set of investments. Note also that research on transmission planning methods is on-going with 
projects, such as Realise Grid (Realisegrid, 2012) and E-highways (ENTSO-E, 2012c).
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1.2 Project definition
The project definition refers to the delineation of the 
object to be evaluated. Hereafter we discuss transmis­
sion and storage projects separately. Due to the strong 
interactions between different investments, the defi­
nition of project boundaries is not straightforward 
for the former, while easier for the latter. 
1.2.1 Transmission investment
In network industries, projects typically interact, i.e. 
they can be (1) complementary, or (2) competitive. 
First, complementary investments refer to the pres­
ence of positive interactions between investments. In 
this case they should be evaluated as a single project. 
Otherwise, the individual evaluation would lead to 
underestimation of the potential net benefit of devel­
oping the two investments, since the complementa­
rities would not be considered. The project promot­
ers should have incentives to identify and cluster the 
complementary investments in their project proposi­
tion. 
Second, when the added value of one investment is 
decreased by the presence of the other, those invest­
ments are competitive. They should be evaluated 
separately (by the project promoter) and jointly (by 
the Regional Group or the Ten Year Network Devel­
opment Plan). The joint evaluation is needed because 
there is a possibility that both projects show econom­
ic viability. However, if they are both built, the overall 
net benefit will be lower than the sum of the individ­
ual net benefits. Therefore, the joint evaluation would 
allow the evaluator to estimate the potential nega­
tive interactions between the competitive projects. 
Before performing joint evaluation, it is necessary to 
anticipate which projects could be potentially com­
petitive. It is worth noting that competitive invest­
ments do not only refer to the (1) size of the projects, 
but also to the (2) location and even (3) design of the 
project: 
First, projects can compete in terms of size. For in­
stance, for developing the Norned HVDC project 
connecting Norway and Netherland, DTe (2004) has 
compared two different capacities (600 MW and 1200 
MW). 
Second, in terms of location, different paths might 
exist to develop a new transmission line. They need 
to be evaluated in order to find the solution that max­
imises net benefit. For instance, for the new intercon­
nection between Spain and France several alterna­
tives were studied including through the Pyrenees, or 
partly offshore (Monti, 2008).
Third, a variety of options might exist in terms of de-
sign of the project, especially in case of green field 
type of investment. For instance, the feasibility study 
of offshore grid connection at Kriegers Flak (Energi­
net.dk, 2009) compares different structures (stan­
dalone lines versus combined solutions), and among 
combined solutions different technology choices are 
compared (AC­based, VSC­based and hybrid). 
What is given by the Energy Infrastructure Package
The Regulation defines the minimum criteria for pro­
ject eligibility (Annex2). Projects of Common Inter­
est must, first of all, contribute significantly to at least 
one of the following EU energy objectives: “(i) market 
integration, inter alia through lifting the isolation of at 
least one Member state and reducing energy infrastruc-
ture bottlenecks; competition and system flexibility; (ii) 
sustainability, inter alia through the integration of re-
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newable energy into the grid and the transmission of 
renewable generation to major consumption centres 
and storage sites; and (iii) security of supply, inter alia 
through interoperability, appropriate connections and 
secure and reliable system operation”. Moreover, they 
shall also involve at least two Member States, either 
by directly crossing the border or by fulfilling the de­
fined thresholds. Indeed, in order to qualify, a trans­
mission project located in only one Member State, 
shall be a project that “changes the grid transfer ca-
pacity at the border of that Member State with one or 
several other Member States or at any other relevant 
cross-section of the same transmission corridor by at 
least 500 Megawatt compared to the situation without 
commissioning of the project.”
Despite allowing for consideration of the comple­
mentarity between different investments, defining the 
projects by threshold might entail a risk that projects 
are grouped in order to reach the transfer capacity 
threshold. 
What is proposed by ENTSO-E 
The ENTSO­E draft proposal (2012a) defines an ad­
ditional threshold for project clustering: “The influ-
ence of the investment on the increase of Grid Trans-
fer Capacity must be substantial; otherwise it should 
not be a part of the cluster. Hence, if the influence is 
lower than 20%, the investment will not be considered 
as a part of the project.” 
This approach therefore ensures that only projects 
that significantly contribute to this common goal of 
increasing the capacity on a certain border can be 
grouped. However, the objective should rather be to 
group projects which are complementary in terms of 
their net benefit, i.e. the net benefit of both projects 
together is higher than the sum of the net benefit of 
the individual projects. 
Recommendation
First, projects should only be grouped when strong 
complementarities are present. It should be the re­
sponsibility of the project promoter to provide evi­
dence on the complementarities between investments 
that are proposed as a single project. 
Second, competitive projects should be evaluated 
both individually and together, which can also be 
considered as using a different baseline to evaluate 
the project (see Section 1.3.2).
1.2.2 Storage investment
Regarding storage facilities, the project definition is 
rather clear. However, it is worth noting that in spe­
cific cases, storage could be an alternative solution to 
transmission reinforcement (Box 2). If so, the storage 
and transmission reinforcement projects should be 
evaluated as competitive projects. 
What is given by the Energy Infrastructure Package
The Regulation defines that, for storage facilities, the 
project must “provide 225 MW installed capacity and 
to have a storage capacity that allows a net annual 
electricity generation of at least 250 Gigawatt hours”. 
These minimum criteria imply that only large­scale 
storage facilities are concerned. The Regulation 
requires a common input data set for transmission 
and storage projects (Annex V of the Regulation) and 
prescribes a minimum effect mapping: “For electricity 
transmission and storage, the cost-benefit analysis shall 
at least take into account the impacts on the indicators 
defined in Annex III”. 
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What is proposed by ENTSO-E 
In the ENTSO­E draft proposal (2012a) was initially 
only for transmission lines, but has been revised to 
also include electricity storage.
Recommendation
It is important to have the same CBA method for 
transmission and storage projects because they can 
be competitive projects that need to be considered as 
alternatives (Box 2). 
Box 2: Storage could be an alternative to transmission reinforcement.
As widely discussed, transmission lines do not necessarily need to be rated at the peak wind power generation 
(Keuhoff et al., 2007; Pattanariyankool and Lave, 2010; Phillips and Middleton, 2012). Given the relatively low 
capacity factor of wind generation (typically between 20-50%), downsizing the transmission line at the cost of 
some wind curtailment could be more economical. In fact, storage can also help in downsizing the transmission 
line, or defer the need of transmission investment, by smoothing the wind (or other intermittent renewable 
energy sources) generation profile, as illustrated in the Figure below.
Storage could defer or downsize the transmission investment by smoothing the wind output                            
 (ΔX represents the deferred or reduced transmission capacity).
The benefit of electricity storage to defer transmission and distribution upgrade has been discussed in numerous 
papers. Eyer et al. (2005) provides guidelines on how to identify favorable sites for storage as transmission and 
distribution capacity deferral. Deholm and Sioshansi (2009) show the trade-off between transmission and storage 
as a function of transmission investment costs. He et al. (2011) studies a case in which a compressed air energy 
storage unit provide congestion management services to the transmission system operator in France. Pieper and 
Rubel (2010) also show that transmission and distribution deferral could be a viable business case for storage 
operators in the current US power system.  
8Final Report – January 2013
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1.3 Baseline definition
In CBA, all investments are evaluated against a com­
mon baseline. In this section, we discuss three key is­
sues for the definition of the baseline, which are how 
to decide on the time horizon of the analysis (Section 
1.3.1), how to take into account interaction between 
proposed projects (Section 1.3.2), and how to ensure 
consistency and quality of the data underlying the pa­
rameters of the baseline (Section 1.3.3). 
1.3.1 Time horizon
When defining the time horizon of the analysis, there 
is always a trade­off between capturing longer­term 
effects and increased uncertainty. Therefore, the 
timeframe of the analysis should be limited to the 
point where the assessment is still meaningful. The 
convention is 20­25 years, even for electricity projects 
that can have a lifetime of over fifty years EC (2008).
What is given by the Energy Infrastructure Package
The Regulation mentions that “The methodology shall 
be based on a common input data set representing the 
Union’s electricity and gas systems in the years n+5, 
n+10, n+15, and n+20, where n is the year in which 
the analysis is performed”.
Bearing in mind that projects that will be built at n+20 
can be included in the baseline, 20 years is implicitly 
the minimum timeframe that the Regulation requires 
to be analyzed.
What is proposed by ENTSO-E
In the ENTSO­E draft proposal (2012a), several 
options are presented: mid­term (5­10 years), long­
term (10­20 years), and very long term (30­40 years). 
The draft also refers to the long­term horizon as 
a bridge between mid­term and very long­term 
analysis. Moreover, it is mentioned that while other 
time horizons are optional, the long­term (10­20) 
horizon is to be used systematically.
Recommendation
We agree that a 20­25 year time horizon is in line with 
good practice.
1.3.2 Interaction between proposed projects 
The interaction between projects can be shown by the 
divergence of the CBA results under two baselines, 
one with all proposed projects and one without any of 
the proposed projects. A significant divergence would 
signal the need for additional analysis.
What is given by the Energy Infrastructure Package
The Regulation requires that the baseline includes 
“scenarios for demand, generation capacities by fuel 
type (…) and their geographical location, fuel prices 
(…), carbon dioxide prices, the composition of the 
transmission and, if relevant, the distribution network, 
and its evolution, taking into account all new significant 
generation (…), storage and transmission projects for 
which a final investment decision has been taken and 
that are due to be commissioned by the end of year 
n+5”. 
This provision in combination with the one quoted 
in the previous section, implies that the baseline 
should include as a minimum the projects that are to 
be commissioned by the end of n+5 and for which a 
final investment decision has been taken and could 
include as a maximum the projects that are to be 
commissioned in n+20. Note that the Regulation does 
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however not specify whether candidate Projects of 
Common Interest should be included in the baseline.
What is proposed by ENTSO-E
The ENTSO­E draft proposal (2012a) discusses two 
options to treat the candidate Projects of Common 
Interest in the baseline, namely the Take Out One at 
the Time (TOOT) method and the Put IN one at the 
Time (PINT). To put it simply, TOOT implies that 
each project is evaluated against the baseline featuring 
the whole forecasted network, which consists of the 
existing network plus the projects to be evaluated, 
while with PINT the forecasted network does not 
include any of the projects to be evaluated. ENTSO­E 
favors the TOOT method: “The advantage of this 
analysis is that it immediately appreciates every benefit 
brought by each investment item, without considering 
the order of investment.” 
Note that in the application of the TOOT method, 
ENTSO­E proposes to include the TYNDP projects in 
the baseline: “The TYNDP network is then considered 
as the reference grid.” From 2015 onwards, this is fine 
because the TYNDP will have to include third­party 
projects so that the ENTSO­E proposal implies to 
evaluate projects against a baseline that includes all 
candidate Projects of Common Interest. 
Recommendation
The proposed projects should be evaluated against 
two baselines, one including and the other excluding 
all other proposed projects. In case of significant 
inconsistencies between results under the two 
baselines, further analysis is warranted.  
1.3.3 Data consistency and quality
As the baseline refers to a forecasted future, it needs 
to be consistent with the EU energy policy objectives. 
In the context of the Energy Roadmap 2050 (EC, 
2011c; EC, 2011d; Meeus et al 2011; Meeus, 2012), 
scenarios that achieve these objectives have already 
been developed that can now also be used in the 
context of the Energy Infrastructure Package.
The Roadmap contains many if not most of the 
parameters needed in the CBA analysis, including 
demand, generation and storage capacities, network 
characteristics, fuel prices and carbon prices. This 
data has already been validated, while there may of 
course be the need to revisit some of the parameters. 
Public consultation is a good way to ensure the quality 
of the data that will be used in the baseline.
What is given by the Energy Infrastructure Package
The Regulation mentions the need to ensure 
transparency for all stakeholders concerned. In 
Annex V of the Regulation, the Commission requires 
that the “data set shall be elaborated after formally 
consulting Member States and the organizations 
representing all relevant stakeholders”.
Moreover, the Regulation also requires the analysis to be 
updated every two years, providing also an opportunity 
to update the data used to build the baseline scenarios. 
What is proposed by ENTSO-E 
The ENTSO­E draft proposal (2012a) states that 
the reference scenario “should be the one that best 
reflects the official European energy politics and 
goals.” For this reason, ENTSO­E proposes the use 
of a top­down scenario, considering that it better 
represents one harmonized European energy policy. 
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ENTSO­E also includes generation flexibility in the 
baseline, such as efficiency rate, flexibility and must­
run obligations. A public consultation process is 
proposed to validate the data, following the current 
practice in the context of the Ten Year Network 
Development Plan (ENTSO­E, 2012b).
Recommendation
ENTSO­E has taken the necessary measures to ensure 
data quality. It is however also important to ensure 
that the top­down scenario ENTSO­E proposes to 
use is consistent with the scenarios in the Energy 
Roadmap 2050 (in Section 2.3 we discuss how this 
can be done).
1.4 Effect mapping
In this section, the objective is to deduct the most rel­
evant effects to be considered in the CBA. We first 
draw a comprehensive list capturing all possible ef­
fects of electricity infrastructure projects (Section 
1.4.1), and then reduce it to a list that includes the 
most relevant effects only (Section 1.4.2). This pro­
posed reduced list is then checked with the Regula­
tion and the draft of ENTSO­E.  
1.4.1 Comprehensive list
The existing literature provides limited guidance 
(Annex 3), but a comprehensive list of possible 
effects basically includes (1) the impact within the 
power system, and also the impact beyond, i.e. (2) 
externalities as well as (3) macroeconomic effects 
(Figure 2). 
(1) Within the power system, we distinguish the 
different effects according to activities, which can be 
classified into infrastructure (transmission), production 
(generation), consumption and other activities.
Figure 2: Three layers of effects generated by 
infrastructure projects
­ Infrastructure costs include capital costs of 
construction (capex) as well as operation and 
maintenance costs (opex) over the lifetime of the 
infrastructure.
­ Production cost savings refers to the benefits 
associated with a more efficient dispatching and a 
more efficient use of ancillary and balancing services, 
consisting of the reduction in variable costs of 
production (opex) and the avoided investment cost 
(capex).
­ Gross consumer surplus or willingness to pay refers 
to the benefits resulting from changes in consumption 
volume.
­ Finally, there are other market benefits resulting from 
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electricity infrastructure investments, such as those 
due to changes in market liquidity and competition 
(Borenstein et al., 2000).
(2) With respect to externalities, there are mainly 
four different effects to be considered: CO2 emissions 
reduction, integration of renewable energy, inferred 
local environmental and social costs and the benefits 
related to early deployment.
­ CO2 emissions: New infrastructure will lead to a 
re­dispatching of power plants, which may include 
substituting coal with gas plants, and it may also 
lead to the reduction of electricity generation, and 
emissions, due to the reduction of system losses.
­ Renewable energy: Re­dispatching due to the 
development of new infrastructure may also allow for 
reduction of renewable energy spilling.
­ Local environmental and social costs: The development 
of new infrastructure will have an impact on the site 
where it is developed and on the surrounding area. 
This impact implies additional costs, i.e. local social 
and environmental costs. There can be biodiversity 
costs, landscape costs and costs related to noise, land­
use, health and resource depletion.
­ Early deployment benefits: The benefits of electricity 
infrastructure projects can also include an increase 
in knowledge about certain types of technology or 
project. However, early deployment also involves the 
risk of sinking investment are done prematurely in 
technologies that later turn out to be inefficient.
(3) Electricity infrastructure investments may also 
have an impact at the macroeconomic level, including 
creation of jobs and increase in economic growth of 
the impacted countries/regions.
Figure 3 illustrates what a comprehensive list of effects 
could consist of.
Figure 3: Comprehensive list of effects
1.4.2 Reduced list
Some effects included in the comprehensive list may 
not be relevant for all projects, and effects can also 
overlap. These effects should be dismissed in order 
to improve the clarity and reduce the unnecessary 
complexity of the CBA. The dismissal of effects is 
based on the two­step scrutiny of the effects presented 
in the comprehensive list. 
(1) Some of the effects identified above are already 
mostly or partly internalized in effects within the 
power system.
- The benefits of reducing of CO2 emissions have 
been internalized in the production cost savings. 
Indeed, given the existence of a carbon price, 
the benefits of a reduction of CO2 emissions 
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will be captured by a decrease in production 
costs. Therefore, if we would also consider the 
emissions as a separate effect, this would imply 
double counting.5 Note that one could argue that 
the current carbon price does not adequately 
reflect the externality cost of emissions, but this 
should then be dealt with in the set­up of the 
baseline scenario that includes the carbon price.
- Similarly, the benefits related to a better integration 
of renewable energy have also been internalized 
in the production cost savings. Indeed, given 
the existence of the 2020 target for renewable 
energy, infrastructure that reduces the spilling of 
renewable energy will not necessarily increase the 
renewable energy that will be produced by 2020. 
Infrastructure investments will rather reduce 
the renewable energy capacity that needs to be 
installed to achieve the renewable energy target.
- Local and environmental costs have been 
internalized in the infrastructure costs. The 
Environmental Impact Assessment (Directive 
85/337/EEC) indeed includes requirements for 
the impact on human beings, on the local fauna 
and flora, on material assets, and on cultural 
heritage. The costs of the necessary measures to 
meet these requirements are therefore included in 
the infrastructure costs. However, requirements 
for visual impact do not yet exist at EU level 
so that it might be necessary to consider this 
effect separately for projects with an exceptional 
visual impact (e.g. projects in densely populated, 
protected, or tourist areas).
- Early deployment benefits have also been 
5  For example, in the business case study of East­West 
HVDC interconnector (Eirgrid, 2008), the economic value of re­
duced CO2 emission and reduced wind curtailment are presented 
as benefit whilst they should already be counted in the produc­
tion cost saving. 
internalized in the infrastructure costs. EU 
innovation policies indeed include specific funds 
for demonstration. For most projects this effect 
should therefore not be considered separately, 
while exceptions could be made for first of a kind 
projects. 
(2) Furthermore, there are effects that are likely to be 
similar across different projects so that they will not 
affect the ranking. 
- Other market benefits are relatively similar 
for most projects, and are usually very small 
compared to other relevant effects. This is 
because the effect on competition and liquidity 
is usually limited. Exceptions can be projects that 
significantly change the structure of a market, 
such as projects in isolated areas. 
- Macroeconomic effects are relatively similar for 
most projects. Infrastructure investments are 
commonly mentioned as an important pillar of 
economic growth (EC, 2010), but the impact of 
individual projects is likely to be similar.
To sum up, the CBA method can concentrate on three 
main effects, i.e. infrastructure costs, production cost 
saving and gross consumer surplus, as illustrated in 
Figure 4. These are the effects that will need to be 
considered for all projects.
What is given by the Energy Infrastructure Package
The Regulation provides guidelines concerning the 
effect mapping in both the Annex IV (criteria for 
PCI) and Annex V (guidelines on CBA). The list of 
criteria provided by the referred documents is not 
intended to be comprehensive, i.e. it refers to effects 
that should be included while it does not state that 
those are all the relevant effects.
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Figure 4: Reduced effect mapping
What is proposed by ENTSO-E 
The ENTSO­E draft proposal (2012a) lists seven 
benefits to be considered (Annex1). It is noted that 
ENTSO­E distinguishes the benefits to be monetized 
and those to be quantified as additional indicators. 
The “Social-economic welfare” and “Variation in 
losses” belong to the first category, while other five 
benefits (“Improved security of supply, RES integration, 
Variation in CO2 emissions, Technical resilience/system 
safety, and Flexibility”) belong to the second category. 
Recommendation
Start the analysis from the reduced list (Figure 4): 
(1) It avoids double counting; (2) it significantly 
simplifies the CBA method so that the results are 
more transparent; (3) it does not exclude that 
additional analysis is made for specific projects for 
which indicators show that the effects that have been 
initially dismissed are significant (Section 2.1.4).
1.5 Distributional effects 
Infrastructure projects that fulfill the eligibility cri­
teria mentioned in Section 1.2 will typically involve 
more than two zones. In most cases, the effects will 
be located in a relatively small area with similar eco­
nomic development, but for specific projects the situ­
ation might be different so that distributional effects 
need to be considered.
Options
There are two possible ways of considering the dis­
tributional effects of a project, i.e. (1) outside and (2) 
inside the CBA. 
First, the distributional effects could be treated out-
side the CBA analysis via a redistribution. For in­
stance, taxes are usually defined to address this issue; 
by applying different taxes to different groups of so­
ciety, distributional effects can be corrected. The ex 
post redistribution allows for a separation between 
the pure efficiency analysis and redistribution deci­
sions. The application of such method at the Euro­
pean level may however be complicated, due to the 
absence of a common tax scheme under the current 
institutional setting. Note however that there are 
other compensating measures, such as EU funds, that 
could fulfill the same purpose; indeed, the European 
Regional Development Fund was developed with a 
similar purpose. Note also that a possible way to deal 
with distributive concerns could be the definition of 
regional quotas by the Commission when adopting 
the Union­wide list of Projects of Common Interest 
(Section 1.1 provides more detail on this process).
Second, inside the CBA, the distributional effect 
could be accounted for by applying different distribu­
tional weights to different groups of agents or to dif­
ferent countries or zones. The consideration of distri­
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butional effects would require defining the different 
weights (for different agents, countries or zones) in a 
manner consistent with distributional policies. 
What is given by the Energy Infrastructure Package
The Regulation does not specify the necessity or the 
way to address distributional effects, but the EU Re­
gional Policy guide on CBA does propose the use of 
social discount rates6. Following this approach, devel­
oping countries have a higher discount rate because 
they have a higher economic growth outlook. This 
would exacerbate distributive concerns because for 
two projects with similar benefits, the project in the 
relatively more developed country would be ranked 
higher than the project in the relatively less developed 
country.
What is proposed by ENTSO-E
The ENTSO­E draft proposal (2012a) does not explic­
itly discuss distributional effects, but it does refer to 
the EU Regional Policy guide. It is said that Regional 
Group should choose a unique discount rate for pro­
jects in the region, except when a project covers both 
countries that are beneficiary of the Cohesion Fund 
and countries that are not.
Recommendation
Distributional effects should be dealt with outside of 
the CBA. 
6  Suggested SDR benchmark values: 5.5% for Cohesion 
and IPA countries, and for convergence regions elsewhere with 
high growth outlook; 3.5% for Competitiveness regions.
2. Calculation of net benefit
In this chapter, we first discuss how to realize a mean­
ingful monetization of the relevant effects referred to 
in the previous chapter (Section 2.1), then how to dis­
count the net benefit (Section 2.2), and finally how to 
deal with uncertainties (Section 2.3). 
2.1 Monetization
In this section, we first concentrate on the effects that 
are relevant for all projects, i.e. infrastructure costs 
(Section 2.1.1), production cost savings (Section 
2.1.2) and gross consumer surplus (Section 2.1.3), 
and then on effects that we dismissed in the previous 
chapter, but that could be relevant for specific projects 
(Section 2.1.4). Note that in this section we do not 
refer to the Regulation because it does not go into the 
details of monetization.
2.1.1 Infrastructure costs 
Infrastructure costs refer to operational and capital 
expenditures of the transmission or storage project. 
Even if the infrastructure costs are typically less 
uncertain than the benefits, lack of information 
might still impede achieving a credible and accurate 
estimation of the costs. 
How to remedy the lack of information
The TYNDP already gathers the information of major 
European electricity infrastructure projects in a single 
document (ENTSO­E, 2012b), but costs are currently 
represented as a single number.
To allow benchmarking, it is important that 
promoters provide more detailed information. An 
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interesting example is the National Grid Offshore 
Information Statement. It provides a detailed account 
of the assumed costs for each of the technological 
components used in the offshore transmission plan in 
the UK (National Grid, 2010a and 2010b).
What is given by the Energy Infrastructure Package
The Regulation requires that “national regulatory 
authorities cooperating in the framework of the Agency 
shall establish and make publicly available a set of 
indicators and corresponding reference values for the 
comparison of unit investment costs for comparable 
projects […].” Thus, the Regulation already recognizes 
the current lack of information regarding investments 
costs, and facilitates benchmarking by requiring the 
publication of national standard costs by the national 
regulatory authorities. 
What is proposed by ENTSO-E
The ENTSO­E draft proposal (2012a) does specify the 
items project promoters should take into account in 
the total project expenditure.7 
Moreover, the environmental and social impact 
of projects is considered as a Key Performance 
Indicator (KPI) instead of a cost item, namely the 
“social and environmental sensibility”. This indicator is 
established through an expert assessment, supported 
by preliminary environmental studies.
7  They include costs for materials and assembly costs; for 
temporary solutions that are necessary to realize a project; costs 
for approval procedure; costs for devices that have to be replaced 
within a given period; dismantling costs at the end of the life cycle; 
other life­cycle costs. Residual value will be included in the last 
year of the analysis representing other costs that are expected after 
the horizon of the analysis, using a standard depreciation formula.
Recommendation
Infrastructure costs need to be reported disaggregated. 
There should be a predefined list of cost components 
that promoters are required to report separately. 
The list of items proposed by ENTSO­E can be the 
starting point, but the costs incurred for mitigating 
environmental or social impact of the project should 
also be presented separately and included in the total 
project expenditure.
2.1.2 Production cost savings
Infrastructure investments can lead to a more 
efficient dispatch of production units, resulting in 
both short­ and long­term production cost savings 
(Box 3).  The estimation of these savings is essentially 
a modeling issue. 
What model to use
The modeling choices that need to be made include: 
(1) the geographic scope of the model; (2) to what 
extent the operational constraints of power plants 
are represented; (3) whether or not power plant 
investments are taken as given. There are different 
models that could be used, but there is no perfect 
model. It is important that the assumptions of the 
model are explicitly stated so that its imperfections 
can be corrected with additional analysis for projects 
where these imperfections are significant. 
For instance, if the model assumes that power plant 
investments are given, and if the output of the CBA 
shows that a certain project causes significant price 
changes in a certain zone, this is a clear indication that 
for this project that assumption should be revisited in 
that zone. Indeed, long­term production cost savings 
can be significant for some projects (Box 3).
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What is proposed by ENTSO-E
The ENTSO­E draft proposal (2012a) refers to the 
importance of explicitly mentioning the model used 
by the different regions. The choice of the model is 
left to the ENTSO­E regions, while ENTSO­E does 
propose a minimum consideration of technical 
characteristics of power plants (“efficiency rate and 
CO2 emission rate”) and a minimum geographic 
scope (“all Member States and third countries on 
whose territory the project shall be built, all directly 
neighbouring Member States and all other Member 
States impacted by the project”).
Recommendation 
The model and assumptions used to calculate 
production­cost savings should be clearly explained 
and published. It is also important that the choice of the 
model is coordinated with the data validation process 
of the baseline. If a region would for instance decide 
to use a model with a more detailed representation 
of the operational constraints of power plants, the 
corresponding data should be validated, just like the 
other parameters of the baseline (Section 1.3.3).
2.1.3 Gross consumer surplus
Infrastructure investments, both transmission lines 
and storage units, could influence gross consumer 
surplus in three different ways: (1) reaction of 
demand to price changes; (2) reduction of lost load 
during contingency periods; and (3) improved 
system reliability. In what follows, we discuss the 
issues related to each of these three effects. 
How to deal with demand elasticity
 
The reaction of demand to prices is the so­call demand 
elasticity. As illustrated in Figure 5, the volume 
effect of price reduction (the solid black triangle) is 
typically small in comparison to the price effect (the 
dashed part). In other words, the main effect of a price 
reduction is a transfer of surplus from producers to 
consumers, while the increase in total surplus could 
Box 3: Production cost savings due to infrastructure investments
The re-dispatch resulting from investment in both transmission and storage projects may imply savings on both short and long-
term production costs (i.e. opex and capex).
Short-term benefits of re-dispatch are mostly resulting from allowing higher cost generation units to be replaced by lower cost 
generation units, as well as from reducing operational costs within a specific generation unit, due to enhanced efficiency related 
to a flattened production profile of each generation unit (for both energy supply and ancillary services provision). The former 
benefit should account for the main part of production cost saving. Nevertheless, the non-consideration of the efficiency-related 
operational cost savings would certainly lead to an underestimation of the benefits of infrastructure investments.
Short-term re-dispatch also has an implication for long-term production costs, as it may reduce the need for new generation 
by enhancing the utilization rate of existing assets. Indeed, if the network would be reinforced, less renewable energy would 
be curtailed; consequently, less capacity would be needed to reach the decarbonisation target. The same applies to conven-
tional generation; the elimination of transmission bottlenecks could also avoid conventional generation investment, especially 
the peak load capacity. This long-term effect on investment costs could be relevant, especially when the infrastructure projects 
would induce significant price changes and, consequently, a substantial change in producer surplus. 
For instance, in the CBA evaluation of the East-West interconnector, Eirgrid has considered that by investing in the interconnec-
tor, the investment in a new peak plant at a cost of about €40 million annually could be avoided (approximately 7% of the overall 
estimated benefits) (Nooij, 2011).
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be neglected, unless the demand elasticity is very high 










Figure 5: The effect of demand elasticity on 
consumer surplus 
What is proposed by ENTSO-E
The ENTSO­E draft proposal (2012a) refers to two 
ways of taking into account the greater flexibility of 
demand when assessing the socio­economic welfare, 
and leaves the choice of the method to the regions.
Recommendation
Demand elasticity can be neglected for its relative 
small effect on consumers’ surplus for most projects. 
For projects where large and consistent price changes 
are expected, it may be necessary to consider demand 
response in more detail in order to capture the full 
benefits of the project.
Lack of reference value for lost load
To monetize the effect of reducing lost load during 
contingency periods, we need to know the Value 
Of Lost Load (VOLL). The VOLL depends on the 
regional and sectorial composition and the role of 
electricity in the economy. The VOLL also differs 
as a function of time, location of the interruption, 
notification and frequency of interruption. The 
literature review by Van der Welle and van der Zwaan 
(2007) finds estimates of VOLL between 4 and 40 $/
kWh for developed countries and between 1 and 10 
$/kWh for developing countries. In other words, this 
is a relevant effect that needs to be monetized.
Currently, only some member states have an validated 
reference value, and there is no  European reference 
value. Moreover, there are different methods to 
estimate the value of lost load, which can be roughly 
categorized into two sets: one is based on market 
behavior extrapolation and the other on surveys of 
individual electricity consumers8. CEER (2010) gives 
guidelines on how to consider country specificities 
when estimating the VOLL (Box 4).
What is proposed by ENTSO-E
In the ENTSO­E draft proposal (2012a), changes in 
the volume of energy non­served during contingency 
periods are estimated separately as an indicator for 
improved “security of supply”. ENTSO­E also refers 
to the lack of reliable data throughout Europe as the 
reason not to monetize this effect. 
Recommendation 
A consented approach to calculate the VOLL at 
national level should be established, following the 
guidelines of CEER (2010). An intermediate solution 
could be that a value is agreed upon as part of the data 
validation process for the baseline (Section 1.3.3), for 
8  The former extrapolates consumers’ willingness to pay 
out of the observation of market behaviour, such as power cur­
tailment contracts and investment in back­up generation, while 
the latter refers to conduct a survey asking individuals to elicit 
their intended willingness to pay in constructed situations. SIN­
TEF (2010) gives recommendations on the most appropriate ap­
proach for different sets of users. 
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example based on values in those countries where 
specific studies have already been undertaken.
 
How to deal with extreme events
Most projects contribute to the reliability of the 
system, but this is not necessarily what differentiates 
them for ranking. An exception could be a project 
that targets a crucial weakness of the system to help 
avoid extreme events, like a black out. In all other 
cases, this issue could be ignored for ranking projects.
What is proposed by ENTSO-E
In the ENTSO­E draft proposal (2012a), the project’s 
ability to improve the system response during 
contingencies and extreme scenarios is assessed 
through the evaluation of KPIs. The scoring of three 
KPIs is summed to provide the total score of the 
project in terms of “Technical resilience/system safety 
margin”. The evaluation of each individual indicator 
would be based on professional power engineering 
judgment rather than only on algorithmic calculation.
Recommendation
The impact of the project on the avoidance of extreme 
events can be disregarded from the calculation of the 
net benefit. But, when a project shows to be relevant 
in the reinforcement of a crucial weakness of the 
system, this effect should be monetized and included 
in the net benefit calculation.
2.1.4 Project-specific effects
As discussed in Section 1.4.2, to arrive to our 
reduced list of effects that are relevant for all projects, 
we dismissed some effects that could be relevant 
for specific projects. These projects then require 
additional analysis. The key issue is to have indicators 
to detect when additional analysis is warranted. 
 
 
Box 4: CEER guidelines on VOLL
The Council of European Energy Regulators (CEER) has issued Guidelines of Good Practice on the Estimation of Costs due to 
Electricity Interruptions and Voltage Disturbances in December 2010. One high-level conclusion is that National Regulatory Au-
thorities should perform nationwide cost-estimation studies regarding electricity interruptions and voltage disturbances. It also 
recommends the cost-estimation studies should be adapted to country-specific characteristics in the following aspects: 
•	 Objective of the cost-estimation study; 
•	 Choice of customer groups and standard industrial classification;
•	 Data available for the normalization factor(s);
•	 Worst case scenarios and use of electricity;
•	 Choice of interruption scenarios and voltage disturbance phenomena; and
•	 Conduction method (response rates and sample size).
The report gives the examples of Italy and Norway. From 2012 on, the Italian NRA has set a transmission reliability incentive at 40 
Eur/MWh, based on the weighted average for household and for business consumers of willingness to pay for avoiding lost load 
and willingness to accept compensation for it.  In Norway, the values of lost load are in the range 5 - 205 NOK/kWh (8 NOK = 1 €).  
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How to detect that additional analysis could 
be needed
Table 2 lists the indicators that can be used to detect 
whether additional analysis could be needed to 
monetize the other market benefits, early deployment 
benefits and local environmental and social costs. 
For other market benefits, such as competition 
and liquidity, there are well­established market 
concentration indicators (Hauteclocque and Glachant, 
2009). For early deployment, the technology that is 
used can be an indication, but also whether a project 
is a first of a kind (e.g. offshore versus onshore). 
For local environmental and social costs, is mainly 
about the visual impact of a project so that possible 
indicators include population density whether the 
affected area is populated, touristic, or protected.
Note also that the type of analysis that is needed 
to capture these effects that we initially dismissed 
is generally complex. Indeed, to capture the other 
market benefits, the strategic behavior of power plants 
needs to be modeled (so that equilibrium models9 
and agent­based models10 need to be used); for early 
deployment benefits, the non­internalized benefits 
9  Equilibrium models can be divided into different cat­
egories: Cournot competition where firms compete in quantity 
(Hogan, 1997; Neuhoff et al., 2005; Ivanic et al., 2004); the sup­
ply function equilibrium approach where firms compete both in 
quantity and price (Green and Newbery, 1992; Baldick and Ho­
gan, 2001); and the multiple­unit auction approach (von der Fehr 
and Harbord, 1994).
10  Weidlich and Veit (2008) present a survey on agent­
based wholesale electricity market models. Veit et al. (2009) ap­
plies this approach to assess market power with transmission ca­
pacity constraint.
of being a fist mover should be weighed against the 
option value of waiting (Pennings and Lint, 1997; 
Olmos et al., 2011); for local environmental and social 
costs, the “Externalities of Energy” (ExternE) project 
provides guidance11. The complexity of the required 
analysis ­ and the uncertainty inherent in the results ­ 
reinforces our argument that these effects should not 
be considered for all projects, but only for projects 
where indicators show that it could be justified to 
perform additional analyses. 
11  ExternE is a research project of the European Com­
mission which aim is to attach a monetary value to all external 
effects originating from energy related activities (ExternE, 2005). 
Here, a specific method to attribute a value to the impact on vis­
ual amenities has been developed, which could be used for this 
purpose. The benchmark values resulting from this research pro­
ject are publicly available and are currently used by the European 
Commission (DG Environment) to value external costs of public 
and private investments.
Table 2: Example of indicators to evaluate the relevance of project-specific effects
Other market benefits Early deployment benefits Local environmental andsocial costs
Indicators Market concentration indica-tors, Isolated areas
Technology,
First of a kind
Population density, protected 
area, touristic area
20
Final Report – January 2013
http://think.eui.eu
2.2 Inter-temporal discounting of 
costs and benefits
Inter­temporal discounting is about enabling the 
comparison between effects that occur at different 
points in time. The main issues are: (1) Low or high 
discount rate; (2) single or multiple discount rates; 
and (3) reference point. Note that in this section we 
do not refer to the Regulation because it does not go 
into the details of discounting.           
Low or high discount rate
Fundamentally, the discount rate reflects the 
opportunity cost of capital, i.e. by investing in one 
project we sacrifice the return from investing in another 
project. 
- A lower bound for the discount factor is therefore 
a risk­free, social discount rate, assuming a 
perfectly functioning financial market. This value 
may be country specific, since it is supposed 
to reflect the long­term rate of growth in the 
economy. 
- A higher bound can then be obtained by 
incorporating the risk related to the financial 
assets12, the financial portfolio of the specific 
actor13, and the risk related to the underlying 
project14. Note that a discount rate can also 
include inflation (nominal rate) or not (real rate).
12  The rates of return of different financial assets 
differ. For example, a governmental bond is often consid­
ered a financial asset with lower risk than other financial 
derivatives.
13  It means the proportion of equity, debt and fi­
nancing leverage of the investor. 
14  Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) is a tool to 
estimate the cost of capital, which expresses the cost of eq­
uity for a project as the sum of a risk­free rate and a risk 
premium. The size of the risk premium depends on the risk 
of an asset relative to the market as a whole (Brattle, 2004).
A higher discount rate means that the welfare of the 
current users is prioritized over the welfare of future 
users. Note also that the discount rate tends to be a 
critical factor for electricity infrastructure projects. 
For instance in the case of the CBA performed for the 
NorNed interconnector (de Nooij, 2011), increasing 
the discount rate from 6% to 9% more than halved the 
net benefit from 448 to 213 M Euro. 
What is proposed by ENTSO-E
The ENTSO­E draft proposal (2012a) says that the 
value of the discount rate to be used in the CBA 
should lay between a lower and a higher bound, 
without constraining the choice on how to calculate 
the discount rate and which factors to take into 
account. 
Moreover, ENTSO­E requires consistency between 
the discount rate used and the valuation of costs and 
benefits, i.e. real prices implies real rate, nominal 
prices imply nominal rate.
Recommendation
As these projects are candidates to receive the PCI 
label, they are likely to receive higher confidence from 
potential investors and, consequently, a facilitated 
access to capital. Thus, the lower rather than the 
higher bound discount rate should be used. Most 
important is that this parameter is validated, just like 
the parameters of the baseline (Section 1.3.3). 
Single or multiple discount rate
Electricity infrastructure projects in Europe are likely 
to have similar access to capital, considering that they 
will be subject to similar regulatory treatment and/or 
will be eligible for EU financial support. A single rate 
should therefore be used. Using multiple rates would 
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imply that we would not only compare the European 
added value of these projects, but for instance also the 
financial strength of the project promoters.
Note also that if we apply different discount rates 
to different countries ­ based on expected growth 
prospects ­ projects in more developed countries 
would be discounted at a lower rate than those in the 
less developed ones. This would imply that we would 
rank projects from less developed countries lower 
than projects from more developed countries, while 
from a distributional point of view we should rather 
do the opposite.
What is proposed by ENTSO-E
The ENTSO­E draft proposal (2012a) refers to a 
single discount rate per region, as given by the 
regional policy: “Moreover, for comparison purposes 
and simplicity, following the EC guide on CBA (page 
208-210), each Regional Group should choose a unique 
discount rate for the projects in the region, except when 
the project covers both countries that are beneficiary of 
the Cohesion Fund and countries that are not.”
Recommendation
A common EU­wide discount factor should be used 
and agreed upon through an open consultation 
process. 
Reference point
The reference point should be the same for all projects 
to enable the comparison of the net benefit of these 
projects.
 
What is proposed by ENTSO-E
In the ENTSO­E draft proposal (2012a), the reference 
point is the present. 
Recommendation
The ENTSO­E proposal is fine, as it allows projects to 
be compared.
2.3 Uncertainty
In this section, we distinguish between (1) uncertain­
ties in the baseline and (2) project uncertainties, as 
they require a different analytical approach.  
2.3.1 Uncertainties in the baseline
When performing a CBA analysis, uncertainties 
are unavoidable, since several assumptions need to 
be made regarding the parameters of the baseline 
scenario. 
There are three methods to deal with uncertainties 
in the baseline. (1) Sensitivity analysis (Nguyen 
et al., 2002; Sun and Zhang, 2002; Hamby, 1994) 
checks how the net benefit is affected by changes in 
the different parameters to identify the critical ones. 
(2) Multi-scenario analysis (Heydinger and Zentner, 
2006; Schnaars, 1987) tests the robustness of the net 
benefit of a project across possible scenarios of the 
future. By attributing a probability to the different 
scenarios, multi­scenario analysis can also make a 
first approximation of the net benefit distribution of 
a project. (3) Stochastic analysis (Birge and Louveaux, 
1997; Wallace and Fleten, 2003; Maggioni and 
Wallace, 2011) goes a step further in approximating 
the net benefit distribution of a project. This approach 
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requires assigning probabilities to the different 
parameters in the baseline. 
Note that these three methods are complementary 
because stochastic analysis can be done based on 
sensitivity analysis (to know the critical parameters) 
and multi­scenario analysis (to know the ranges for 
these parameters). Indeed, once we have identified 
the range of the critical parameters, we can assume a 
probability function over this range and apply Monte 
Carlo techniques to calculate the distribution of the 
net benefit of the project. Eirgrid (2009), for instance, 
applied this technique to the production cost savings 
of the East­West interconnector.
What is given by the Energy Infrastructure Package
The Regulation requires sensitivity analysis: “Each 
cost-benefit analysis shall include sensitivity analyses 
concerning the input data set, the commissioning date 
of different projects in the same area of analysis and 
other relevant parameters…” 
What is proposed by ENTSO-E
In the ENTSO­E draft (2012a), the use of multi­
scenario analysis is proposed: “At least one other 
scenario [besides the reference scenario] should be 
analysed”, complementing the top­down scenario 
used as baseline with a bottom­up scenario. This 
analysis is supplemented with sensitivity analysis, 
which is translated into KPIs that intend altogether 
to evaluate the ability of the project to ensure that the 
needs of the system are met in a future scenario that 
differs from the present projections, i.e.  Robustness/
Flexibility criterion.
Recommendation
The three methods should be combined: (1) sensitivity 
analysis to identify critical parameters; (2) ranges for 
these critical parameters can then be determined 
based on their values in the scenarios of the Energy 
Roadmap 2050; (3) stochastic modeling can then be 
used to calculate the net benefit distribution of the 
project, by assuming a probability function over the 
ranges of each critical parameter.
2.3.2 Project uncertainties
Projects themselves are also uncertain, both in terms 
of their (1) development timeline and their (2) 
infrastructure costs. Many infrastructure projects 
have indeed been severely delayed. For instance, in the 
specific case of the Poland­Lithuania link, the project 
was under discussion for over fifteen years before 
moving ahead (Mielczarski, 2008). This motivated 
the appointment of European Coordinators for some 
of these projects. Infrastructure costs are uncertain 
because not many projects have been developed, but 
also because new technologies are being used or new 
territories are covered, like offshore. 
Project uncertainties are by definition project specific 
so they are not captured by the uncertainties in the 
baseline. To the extent that they cannot be avoided, 
they will therefore need to be considered separately. 
Eirgrid (2009) for instance considered that the 
infrastructure costs for the East­West Interconnector 
(500 MW) are between been 36 and 43 M Euro per 
year. 
What is given by the Energy Infrastructure Package
There are several provisions that can reduce the 
uncertainties of the project development timeline. 
Moreover, the above quote already referred to the 
commissioning data as one of the relevant parameters 
for sensitivity analysis.
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What is proposed in ENTSO-E
The ENTSO­E draft proposal (2012a) says that: 
“The uncertainty in the commissioning date of some 
future assets could nevertheless require a conservative 
approach when building the planning cases.” .. “A case 
without one or some reinforcements foreseen, as well as 
cases including less conservative approaches, could be 
analysed. ” ENTSO­E also proposes to use ranges for 
infrastructure costs rather than single values.
Recommendation
The ENTSO­E proposal already addresses the issue of 
project uncertainties. 
3. Ranking projects 
As previously mentioned, the CBA method will 
be used to rank projects that are proposed to be 
selected as a Project of Common Interest (PCI). In 
what follows, we argue that the mean value of the net 
benefit distribution should be used to rank projects, 
with a possible adjustment for competitive projects, 
and uncertainty in some cases.
The net benefit of CBA should already contain 
all relevant effects
One could argue that certain effects are so difficult 
to quantify that they should not be included in the 
calculation of the net benefit. Instead, they could 
then be provided as an indicator so that projects 
can be ranked based on their net benefit and a set 
of indicators. As illustrated in the previous chapter 
and summarized in Annex 1, the ENTSO­E draft 
proposal (2012a) is indeed to monetize some effects, 
and to provide indicators for others. 
If projects are then ranked based on the monetized 
net benefit in combination with these indicators, 
it implies an implicit monetization of effects that 
have not been monetized explicitly. Such an implicit 
approach is less transparent and allows for subjective 
judgment. Therefore, even the difficult to quantify 
effects should be monetized when they are relevant, 
as discussed in Section 2.1.
There is a need to adjust the ranking of competi-
tive projects
In section 1.3.2, we recommended that projects should 
be evaluated against two baselines, one including and 
the other excluding all other proposed projects. For 
the initial ranking one of the two baselines would 
need to be chosen. 
If the ENTSO­E proposal would be followed, the 
initial ranking would be based on the baseline with all 
proposed projects included. When two competitive 
projects are proposed and ranked against this 
baseline, they will be ranked low and both could even 
exhibit a negative net benefit, while developing one 
of them could be strongly beneficial. To detect this 
kind of cases, the other baseline could be used, and 
the ranking of these projects then might need to be 
adjusted based on additional analysis.
Note also that if the ranking would instead be based 
on the baseline excluding all other proposed projects, 
we would have the opposite problem. Competitive 
projects would both be ranked high, even in cases 
where it is only beneficial to develop one of them. 
In other words, there is no perfect baseline, and 
adjustments to the initial ranking will anyway be 
needed for competitive projects.
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There is a need to adjust the ranking for uncer-
tainties
In Section 2.3, we recommended a stochastic analysis 
in order to assess how uncertainties may affect the 
net benefit. Such an approach would provide a net 
benefit distribution, containing information on the 
mean value as well as the possible variation of the 
net benefit from the mean value. This variation is an 
indication of the project risk. 
There might be specific projects with a significantly 
different risk profile than the average project so that 
policy makers might want to adjust the ranking of 
these projects, depending on their risk averseness. 
For instance, in the case illustrated by Figure 6, even 
if the mean value of B is higher than the one of A, 
one could consider to rank A higher since the risk of 
the project is lower, i.e. the deviation from the mean 
value is lower than for project B. 
Figure 6: Graphic illustration of distribution curves for two different projects, A and B.
Legend – A has a lower mean value than B; and A has a lower risk than B (since the deviation from the mean value is lower)
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4. Methodological implications of 
using CBA for cost allocation
The Regulation considers CBA as a tool to enable 
cross­border cost allocation (Box 5). It means that the 
CBA method also needs to identify where the effects 
are localized. 
Infrastructure costs by definition have a geographical 
dimension. The model used to monetize the other two 
main effects (i.e. production cost savings and gross 
consumer surplus) can also provide disaggregated 
output for each zone because it needs a minimum 
network representation with more than one node 
per TSO area. Note only that some of the effects that 
can be relevant for specific projects have public good 
characteristics so that they cannot be easily assigned 
to zones. This is for instance the case for other market 
benefits, early deployment benefits and system 
reliability. For these effects, there could be a simple 
rule of thumb, like allocating them equally among 
zones.
The method recommended for ranking projects 
in this report could therefore also be used for cost 
allocation. It only additional requirement is that the 
output is disaggregated per TSO area.
Box 5: CBA for cost allocation in the Regulation
Projects of Common Interest will have an enhanced regulatory treatment (Article 13). It includes using CBA for cost allocation: 
- Under normal circumstances, the project promoter(s) must provide to all the concerned national regulatory authorities a 
cost-benefit analysis of the infrastructure project, while the final decision on the allocation of costs shall be taken by the na-
tional regulatory authorities.
- In case the national regulatory authorities have not reached an agreement within six months or upon a joint request from 
the national regulatory authorities concerned, the Regulation states that the decision regarding cross-border cost allocation 
shall be taken by ACER that may use CBA output as a decision tool
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Recommendations
The draft method proposed by ENTSO­E is 
an important step in the right direction, but 
improvements can still be done, as we recommend 
below.
Recommendations for the scope of the analysis
1. Interaction between projects must be taken into 
account in the project and baseline definition
The ENTSO­E proposal ensures that only projects 
that significantly contribute to the common goal of 
increasing the capacity on a certain border can be 
grouped. However, the objective should be to group 
together projects which are complementary in terms 
of their net benefit, i.e. the net benefit of both projects 
together is higher than the sum of the net benefit of 
the individual projects. Project promoters should 
be made responsible for providing evidence on the 
complementarities between investments that are 
proposed as a single project.
2. Data consistency and quality should be ensured
A public consultation is a good way to ensure the 
quality of the data that will be used in the baseline. 
ENTSO­E has already proposed such a consultation 
to validate the data, following the current practice in 
the context of the Ten Year Network Development 
Plan. It is also important to ensure the consistency of 
the scenarios with the Energy Roadmap 2050.
3. Conventional time horizon is 20-25 years
There is a trade­off between capturing longer­term 
effects and increased uncertainty. The ENTSO­E 
proposal is already in line with the conventional time 
horizon.
4. CBA should concentrate on a reduced list of 
effects and those should be monetized
There are three effects that should be monetized for all 
projects, i.e. (1) infrastructure costs, (2) production 
cost savings and (3) gross consumer surplus. There 
are additional effects which may be relevant to specific 
projects and indicators should be used to identify these 
projects and to justify additional analysis to monetize 
also these effects. This can be the case for projects 
with an exceptional visual impact (e.g. projects in 
densely populated, protected or tourist areas) or for 
projects that significantly change the structure of a 
market (e.g. projects in isolated areas) or for projects 
that are exceptionally innovative (e.g. first of a kind 
projects, such as offshore infrastructures).
The ENTSO­E draft proposal lists seven benefits to 
be considered for all projects. A distinction is made 
between effects that are to be monetized, i.e. “social-
economic welfare” and “variation in losses”, and effects 
that are to be quantified as additional indicators, i.e. 
“improved security of supply, RES integration, Variation 
in CO2 emissions, Technical resilience/system safety 
and flexibility”. If projects are then ranked based on 
the monetized net benefit in combination with these 
indicators, it implies an implicit monetization of 
effects that have not been monetized explicitly. Such 
an implicit approach is less transparent and allows for 
subjective judgment.
5. Distributional concerns should not be 
addressed in the calculation of net benefits
The economic analysis of efficiency gains from 
infrastructure projects should be done without 
consideration of distributional effects. If there are 
concerns, they should be resolved with explicit 
political decisions by relevant authorities. The 
European Commission could for instance use 
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regional quotas when defining the EU­wide list based 
on the regional lists.
The ENTSO­E draft proposal does not explicitly 
discuss distributional effects, but it does refer to the 
EU Regional Policy Guide. The guide proposes the 
use of social discount rates, which implies that the 
rates of developing countries are higher because they 
have a higher economic growth outlook. As a result, 
the projects of these countries will be ranked lower 
than projects with similar benefits in developed 
countries, which exacerbates distributional concerns. 
Below, we argue in favor of using a common discount 
factor for all projects.
Recommendations for the calculation of the net 
benefit
6. Infrastructure costs need to be disaggregated
There should be a predefined list of cost components 
that promoters are required to report separately. 
The list of items proposed by ENTSO­E can be the 
starting point, but the costs incurred for mitigating 
environmental or social impact of the project should 
also be presented separately and included in the total 
project expenditure.
7. The model used to monetize the benefits needs 
to be explicitly stated
The draft ENTSO­E proposal leaves certain modeling 
choices to the Regional Groups, while also providing 
some model specifications. There is indeed no single 
model that adequately captures all the production 
cost savings and gross consumer surplus of all 
transmission and storage projects. It is therefore 
important that the assumptions of the model are 
clearly explained to allow for a proper interpretation 
of the CBA results. The choice of the model should 
also be coordinated with the data validation process 
of the baseline.
8. A common discount factor should be used for 
all projects
Projects of Common Interest will have a similar 
regulatory treatment and might also be eligible for 
EU financial support. The label can also improve 
the confidence of potential investors and thereby 
facilitate access to capital. These projects are 
therefore likely to have similar access to capital so 
that a common discount factor should be used for all 
projects. The factor should be agreed upon through 
open consultation, together with the parameters of 
the baseline. The ENTSO­E draft proposal is partially 
in line with this recommendation because there is a 
single discount rate for every region. 
9. A stochastic approach that is consistent with 
the Energy Roadmap 2050 should be used to 
address uncertainty
The Energy Roadmap 2050 already provides possible 
extreme scenarios for the future that are consistent 
with the EU energy and climate objectives. Based 
on these scenarios, a stochastic approach should be 
followed to capture the robustness of projects across 
these possible futures, which would result in a net 
benefit distribution.
The ENTSO­E draft proposal already refers to the use 
of multiple scenarios and the use of sensitivity analysis, 
but not yet a stochastic approach. Nevertheless, it has 
already been implemented by several TSOs in Europe 
for electricity infrastructure projects. We argue that 
this approach should be adopted at EU level and be 
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Recommendation for ranking
10. The ranking should be primarily based on the 
monetized net benefit
The method we recommend above is a stochastic 
approach that calculates a net benefit distribution 
against two baselines, i.e. one with and one without 
all proposed projects. However, to rank projects 
we need a single monetized value. This value could 
be obtained by taking the mean value of the net 
benefit distribution of a project against one of the 
baselines, but adjustments might then be needed 
for (1) competitive projects and (2) uncertainty. For 
these projects, the ranking could be adjusted by the 
decision making body of the Regional Groups (i.e. 
Member States and European Commission).
Observation regarding cost allocation
11. Methodologically, CBA can be used for cost 
allocation
The method recommended for ranking projects 
in this report, could also be used as a basis for cost 
allocation. The only additional requirement is that 
the output is disaggregated per TSO area.
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Annex1: Cost benefit analysis as proposed by ENTSO-E
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Annex 2: Outline of the Regulation
Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on guide­
lines for trans­European energy infrastructure and 
repealing Decision No 1364/2006/EC
Chapter I – General provisions 
Article 1 Subject matter and scope
Article 2 Definitions
Chapter II – Project of common interest
Article 3 Identification of Project of Common In­
terest
Article 4 Criteria for Project of Common Interest 
Article 5 Implementation and monitoring
Article 6 European coordinators
Chapter III – Permit granting and public participa-
tion
Article 7 Regime of common interest
Article 8 ‘Priority status’ of Project of Common 
Interest 
Article 9 Organisation of the permit granting pro­
cess
Article 10 Transparency and public participation
Article 11 Duration and implementation of the 
permit granting process
Chapter IV – Regulatory treatment
Article 12 Energy system wide cost­benefit analy­
sis
Article 13 Enabling investments with cross­border 
impacts
Article 14 Incentives
Chapter V – Financing
Article 15 Eligibility of projects for Union finan­
cial assistance
Chapter VI – Final provisions
Article 16 Reporting and evaluation
Article 17 Information and publicity
Article 18 Transitional provisions
Article 19 Repeal
Article 20 Entry into force
Annex I – Energy infrastructure priority corri-
dors and areas
Annex II – Energy infrastructure categories
Annex III – Regional identification of Project of 
Common Interest 
Annex IV – Rules and indicators concerning cri-
teria for Project of Common Interest 
Annex V – Energy system-wide cost-benefit 
analysis
Annex VI – Guidelines for transparency and 
public participation
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Annex 3: Mapping costs and benefits 
of electricity infrastructure projects
Sources Categories of costs and ben-
efits
Effects within each category
CAISO (2004) Social welfare Consumer surplus
Producer surplus
TSO surplus
Additional benefits Reliability benefits
Benefits from increased operational flexibility
Strategic environmental benefits
Capacity benefits of transmission upgrade
Nordel (2007) Technical costs Investment costs
O&M costs
Environmental costs




Realizegrid (2010) Competitiveness Congestion reduction
Market competitiveness increase
Security of supply Reliability increase
Losses reduction
Environmental sustainability Emissions savings
RES exploitation
Fossil fuel costs reduction
External costs reduction
UN (2006) Benefits for power system Avoided fuel costs
Avoided generation capacity costs
Avoided operation cost
Avoided costs for transmission system improvements
Income from power sales
Benefits for national economy Stimulation of local economies from construction and operation of 
infrastructure
Stimulation of local economies through improved power supply
Increased competition in electricity generation










Economic value of reliability benefits
Added operational and A/S benefits
Insurance and risk mitigation benefits
Investment and resource cost 
benefits
Capacity benefits
Long-term resource cost advantage
Synergies with other transmission projects
External benefits Impacts on fuel markets
Environmental and renewable access benefits
Economic benefits from construction and taxes
 Table A2: Examples of effect mapping
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Annex 4: Conclusions of Industrial 
Council Meeting (based on report 
version “V0”, September 2012)
Serge Galant
Technofi
Submision date: 21 September 2012
1. Background
The present annex aims at shedding light on the first 
round of discussions about the first draft report on 
« Cost benefit analysis in the context of the Energy 
Infrastructure Package ».
2. The issue
The issue raised by the present work deals with 
methodologies for cost benefit analysis of transnational 
investment projects required by the European 
Commission (DG Energy and Competition) when 
examining the proposals made, network operations 
and Member States.
3. What lacks in the first draft report: complete-
ness issues?
There are several basic items which must be included 
in the second version of the report:
1. The European background of the study
ACER has published a position paper1 on January 
2012 (with CEER) on the regulatory issues of the 
energy infrastructure package.
CEER has published a position paper2 on 2010 about 
the evaluation of outage costs (risk components of the 
CBA).
The EC demands are linked with the Directives 
on infrastructure in preparation. Thus, the 
recommendations from the report should: accompany 
the analysis of the TYNDP results provided by 
ENTSO­E within its legal obligations, identify the 
project of common interests, support cross­border 
cost allocation
2. The main benefits brought by CBA Analysis
There should be several types of benefits brought by 
CBA analysis to be performed at EC level: limit the 
potential influence for decisions on infrastructure 
investments, by focusing on network reliability or 
economy­driven motivations, show the robustness 
of projects to extend scenarios and the changes 
(thus allowed by sensitivity analysis); cover all types 
of benefits beyond the ones already tested: capacity 
investment deferral; the creation of ancillary/
balancing services; the overall network reliability 
(which requires valuing the cost of outages); favoring 
the feed­back between project holders and the EC, by 
questioning data results and ranking of projects
3. The time dimension of CBA
Infrastructures are decided for very long (very often 
more than 40 years). There is a need to detail cost and 
benefits over time for a manageable period of time 
(20 years?) which makes scenario analysis plausible.
4. The CBA implementation process
Beyond the methodology itself, it must be recalled 
that it involves multi stakeholder opinions and 
people interactions. Thus the implementation 
process of CBA is also of major importance. Several 
interesting implementation options have been 
discussed including: the second opinion obligation in 
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The Netherlands, the vote when defining and using 
ranking criteria
4. What is still fuzzy and must be clarified?
Clarification must lean on the above solved 
completeness issues and address the following issues:
1. Put the demand of the EC into a dynamic perspective 
at EU level where a lot of research and development 
has been or is being performed on CBA analysis for 
energy infrastructures: past EC funding, on­going EC 
funding, uses by the EC for infrastructure.
2. Detail the features of the CBA recommendations 
which allow taking into account the above three end­
uses by EC (see Section 3).
3. Several methodology issues must be addressed 
in modeling costs and benefits: How to account for 
uncertainty? How to account for local environment 
impacts? How to account for the pricing of scarce 
capacity?
4. For EC applications, the following specific 
issues must be clearly addressed: What are the 
assumptions requested to make CBA analysis useful 
and coherent for the three end­uses? What are the 
limits of monetization of costs and benefits? What 
are the underlying reasons for using or not using a 
multi criteria analysis? What are the most critical 
parameters which condition the result quality?
5. Can CBA analysis shed light on the project 
clustering observed when the TYNDP study is 
delivered by ENTSO­E: How are cluster needs 
explained? How is the clustering performed? 
5. What are the potential incoherencies in the 
first draft which must be addressed?
CBA is first and foremost used to avoid the double 
counting on costs and benefits: it is of paramount 
importance for the electricity sector which has 
specificities when it comes to CBA. However, CBA 
have a time dimension over 50 years for which 
limitations ought to be underlined: what is the 
duration for which CBA for EU use can be taken? 
Due to the intrinsic uncertainty of the input data for 
such CBA4, the proposed answers (costs and benefits) 
must be provided in terms of expected value, linking 
with the modeling of the uncertainties.
Such CBA are used to prepare ranking and decisions: 
what is more critical to ensure the quality of a CBA 
(overestimate benefits or underestimate costs)?
The difficulty of valuing benefits must be underlined 
(delaying generation capacity, extra benefits for 
increasing the reliability of the pan European system, 
etc…).
While reviewing the existing practices by ENTSO­E, 
it is finally important to underline the need for 
the high quality data (with probably the needs for 
standardization): this will avoid the “Garbage In, 
Garbage Out” syndrome, and simplify the comparison 
of CBA analysis results for a cluster of projects or 
competing projects.
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Annex 5: Comments from project 
advisors
Władysław Mielczarski 
Professor at Department of Engineering, 
University of Lodz
Submission date: 6 February 2013
Scope of the Report 
The project deals with the development of 
methodologies to support the implementation of the 
Energy Infrastructure package proposed by European 
Commission. The package contains guidelines for 
trans­European energy infrastructure resulting from 
the agreement between the European Parliament and 
the Council. The Regulation requires the development 
of Cost­Benefit Analysis (CBA) methods (one for 
electricity, and one for gas) to facilitate the selection 
of Projects of Common Interest (PCI). 
The evaluated report has the following structure. 
Chapter 1 describes the scope of the CBA discussing 
the PCI selection process in the context of the 
Regulation. The chapter also maps relevant costs and 
benefits, proposing a reduced list of effects. The second 
chapter is dedicated to the calculation of the net 
benefit of a project, starting from the CBA as defined 
in previous chapter. It indicates that the most relevant 
effects can be monetized and that a single discount 
rate should be used for all projects. In the conclusion 
the chapter proposes a stochastic approach to deal 
with uncertainties. The next chapter concentrates on 
project ranking based on a net benefit distribution 
indicating that the initial ranking of projects should 
be done based on the mean value of their net benefit 
distribution. Chapter 4 analyses the methodological 
implications and points out that the implementation 
of CBA for cost allocation can be limited in some 
cases. This leads to the conclusions that ranking of 
projects can also be used for cost allocation. 
The report provides ten main recommendations, 
stating that:
§	 the interaction between projects must be 
taken into account in the project and baseline 
definition; 
§	 data consistency and quality should be 
ensured; 
§	 a conventional time horizon is 20­25 years; 
§	 a CBA should concentrate on a reduced list of 
effects and those should be monetized; 
§	 distributional concerns should not be 
addressed in the calculation of net benefits; 
§	 infrastructure costs need to be disaggregated; 
§	 the model used to monetize the production 
cost savings and gross consumer surplus 
needs to be explicitly stated; 
§	 a common discount factor should be used for 
all projects; 
§	 a stochastic approach that is consistent with 
the Energy Roadmap 2050 should be used to 
address uncertainty; 
§	 the ranking should be primarily based on the 
monetized net benefit.
Position of the advisor
The opinion of the advisor provided below is based not 
only on theoretical evaluation of the methods proposed 
but also on the practical experience when dealing 
with the international cross border power lines as the 
crucial element of the power infrastructure allowing 
for the development of the common European energy 
market. Between September 2007 and September 2011, 
the advisor served as European Energy Coordinator 
responsible for the facilitation of the development 
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of cross border power lines in Northern Europe. He 
activities were defined by DECISION No 1364/2006/
EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF 
THE COUNCIL of 6 September 2006 laying down 
guidelines for trans­European energy networks. This 
Decision defined the nature and scope of Community 
action to establish guidelines for trans­European 
energy networks. It establishes a series of guidelines 
covering the objectives, priorities and broad lines of 
action by the Community in respect of trans­European 
energy networks. These guidelines identify projects 
of common interest and priority projects, including 
those of European interest, among trans­European 
electricity and gas networks.
Former guidelines
The decision 1364 set up the criteria of the projects 
priority requiring that the project should meet the 
following criteria:
§	 they shall have a significant impact on the 
competitive operation of the internal market; 
§	 they shall strengthen security of supply in the 
Community;
§	 they shall result in an increase in the use of 
renewable energies.
From the list presented above is visible that criteria 
of infrastructure projects were very general not 
providing the adequate tools for the selection of the 
best project from a long list of priority projects.
Evaluation of the project presented
The project entitled “Cost benefit analysis in the context 
of the energy infrastructure package” is very welcome. 
It provide the precise methodologies how to evaluate 
the infrastructure project taking into account cost – 
benefit analysis. From my theoretical knowledge and 
practical experience when dealing with international 
infrastructure project I appreciate both: theoretical 
tools provided and possible practical application of 
the project presented.
In particular I appreciate the finding that a CBA should 
concentrate on a reduced list of effects and those 
should be monetized and the model used to monetize 
the production cost savings and gross consumer 
surplus should to be explicitly stated and analyze as 
well as the indication that a common discount factor 
should be used for all projects.
I also appreciate and support the findings of the project 
that stochastic approach should be implemented and 
that it is consistent with the Energy Roadmap 2050 
when addressing. It is also important to indicates that 
the ranking of the projects should be primarily based 
on the monetized net benefit.
François Lévêque 
Professor at Department of Economics, Mines 
ParisTech
Submission date: 20 January 2013
This report on cost­benefit analysis (CBA, hereafter) 
in the context of the energy infrastructure package 
is especially welcome. It delivers both a didactic 
analysis and detailed and practical recommendations 
on the application of CBA to energy networks’ 
extension. My initial remarks have been fourfold. 
Firstly, the conclusions must be more clear­cut and 
normative. Secondly, a key variable, the discount rate 
plays a critical role. Choosing a low or a high one 
can completely reversed the net difference between 
the costs and benefits. Investing in infrastructure 
is associated with upfront costs and future gains. 
Therefore, ceteris paribus, a new line may be beneficial 
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for society with a low discount factor while incurring 
a net cost if a high discount factor is chosen. Thirdly, 
the authors must put more emphasis on uncertainty. 
CBA does not result in a unique and definite number. 
Many parameters the costs and benefits are based on 
have an uncertain value (e.g., the future price of oil or 
the future cost of lines and breakers). Therefore, it is 
important not to only give the mean of the estimates 
but their standard deviation. Fourthly, CBA in the 
context of the energy infrastructure package aims 
at comparing different projects to know which one 
are the most worthwhile to undertake for society. To 
make this comparison possible, the proponents and 
supporters of the different projects should use the 
same hypothesis regarding external parameters such 
as the price of carbon or the discount rate. The report 
could contribute to this need for standardization. I am 
pleased that the final report has taken these remarks 
into account as well as remarks from other parties. 





ENTSO-E answer to the consultation on 
“Cost Benefit Analysis in the Context of the 
Energy Infrastructure Package” 
Final - 21 December 2012 
 
 
The European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E) is the result of the 2009 EU Third 
Energy Package legislation. Its mandate is to be at the forefront of the European electricity transmission system planning, 
developing market rules and ensuring security of supply in order to deliver Europe’s energy policy objectives. This it is 
reflected in the ENTSO-E deliverables, i.e. network codes - in market, operation and development area - , biennially Ten 
Year Network Development Plans, system adequacy outlooks.   
Additionally, the new EC draft Regulation on "Guidelines for trans-European energy infrastructure" which is to be adopted 
in spring 2013, requests ENTSO-E to daft a Cost and Benefit Analysis methodology applicable to all projects of common 
interest in the electricity field. 
Based on the above, ENTSO-E has put forward a draft CBA methodology, which was and continues to be intensely 
consulted with the EC, ACER and interested stakeholders, either through bilateral meetings or workshops. 
 
Under the EC auspices the European University Institute has prepared a report currently under consultation in which it 
summarizes the institute’s view on the CBA, its opinion on the ENTSO-E’s methodology and recommendations of further 
improvements. 
 
The present document represents ENTSO-E’s answer to the European University Institute consultation of the “Cost 



















1. Specific comments 
 
   





Grouping of investments should only be 
allowed when strong synergies are present. 
Instead of an additional threshold to sort out 
complementary investments (as proposed in 
the ENTSO-E draft), an alternative way to do 
this could be to increase transparency within 
the project proposal. Thereby, the project 
promoter would have to justify the presence in 
the cluster of each individual investment. The 
burden of proof to ensure that 
complementarities are real should be on the 
promoter. 
 
Since the ENTSO-E CBA will be applicable to 
both TYNDP and PCI project assessment, 
ENTSO-E recommends keeping the current 
clustering rule for all TYNDP projects (which 
have a larger scope compared to the new 
regulation PCIs) and further requesting the 
additional details (“burden of proof”) only for the 





Competitive projects should not be included 
in each other’s’ baseline 
CBA could be performed under two distinct 
network baselines 
Both TOOT and PINT should be applied to 
all candidate PCIs 
 
ENTSO-E agrees with this comment and will 
improve the CBA accordingly.  
However, adopting both TOOT and PINT 
methods for the PCIs would entail doubling the 
number of simulations with little added value for 






In order to provide more transparency to the 
public and decision-makers ENTSO-E 
recommends to keep  mapping  and displaying all 
the relevant indicators, including the local social 
and environmental costs (partially internalised), 






If distributional effects are dealt with outside 
the CBA analysis, one should make sure that 
the implementation of the compensating 
measures is feasible. If they are incorporated 
into the CBA, this should be done by using 
different distributional weights for different 
agents, countries or zones, not by using 




ENTSO-E agrees with the implementation of the 
suggested analysis, but solely at the regional 
level since the distributive effects are more visible 























The cost items identified by ENTSO-E could 
be used to enable a disaggregated cost 
presentation of the infrastructure projects. 
Costs incurred for mitigating environmental or 
social impact of the project should also be 
presented separately and included in the total 
project expenditure.  
It also needs to be clarified whether the 
technical or financial life-cycle costs are 
entered in the CBA. In the latter case, the 
method used to calculate the financial life-




Considering the stakeholders’ need ENTSO-E 
CBA incorporates an indicator taking into account 
residual effects on the environment.  
However, presenting separately the costs 
incurred for mitigating environmental or social 
impact of the project may be very difficult to 
implement. This may be considered as an 
additional requirement for candidate PCIs. 
Related to the technical life cycle costs ENTSO-E 






The uncertain cost elements should be 
explicitly presented within the CBA (either in 
the monetization of investment costs or in the 
early deployment additional effects). It is 
recommended to make an as accurate as 
possible estimation of these cost elements, 
while making explicit the assumptions 
underlying the estimation. 
 
Cost estimation is always uncertain for large 
projects, especially using new technologies 
and/or with lack of social acceptance. Specific 
estimations of assumptions for each project are 
not possible for all TYNDP projects, but may be 








The parameters required by the ENTSO-E are 
not sufficient to properly model short-term re-
dispatch; indeed, the provision of minimum up- 
and down-time, ramping and start-up costs is 
not required by the ENTSO-E. 
 
Due to the low impact of the short-term re-
dispatch parameters on the CBA outcomes, 
ENTSO-E will not include in the present 








The method used to calculate production cost 
savings should be explicitly explained 
(« ENTSO-E considers that RG should decide 
which effects to be included in production cost 
savings »), including, for instance, what are 
the effects captured by the model and how 
they are modelled.  
Moreover, we consider that, in case short-term 
effects deriving from a better balancing of 
generation are relevant, these benefits should 
be calculated and monetized, instead of being 
qualitatively evaluated through indicators, as 
proposed by ENTSO-E. 
 
 
The main effects are detailed in the CBA 
methodology. However, ENTSO-E favours the 
use, when available, of several different models 
in order check the robustness of the obtained 
results. 
 
Related to the consideration of ancillary services, 
ENTSO-E has updated its procedure (annex 5). 
The annex notably explains that monetisation of 
ancillary services can only be carried out in 
certain conditions, not fulfilled for the moment in 








As security of supply is one of the most 
important reasons for infrastructure 
investment, estimating the level of value of lost 
load is essential to reveal the value of the 
infrastructure project […]. Until proper 
 
ENTSO-E considers that VOLL should only be 
used if proper surveys - following the CEER 
guidelines - have been carried out in a consistent 
way all over Europe (see annex 4 of updated 




valuations have been undertaken, we 
recommend that values of lost load are set for 
relevant groups and regions as part of the 
baseline setting and public validation process, 
building on existing studies and values for 
other countries or regions. 
assessments and/or even false results is high, 











ENTSO-E considers that short-term demand 
elasticity can be disregarded, since 
consumers do not respond directly to real-time 
market prices, and so the estimation of the 
effect on consumers could be based on the 
price change considering a constant volume. » 
The demand elasticity could be neglected for 
its relative small impact on consumers’ 
surplus. For projects where large and 
consistent changes in prices are expected, it 
may be necessary to consider demand 
responses in more detail in order to capture 




ENTSO-E already considers these assumptions 




of costs and 
benefits 
 
We recommend that projects be evaluated by 
a common, EU-wide discount factor, agreed 
upon through an open consultation process. 
The value of the discount factor should be 
based on the conditions for financing of such 
projects. In cases in which financing costs are 
expected to differ substantially between 
projects, and where this is considered relevant 
for the evaluation and ranking of projects, 
discount factors should differ correspondingly. 
 
 
ENTSO-E considers that the choice of 
assumptions on discount rate should be left to 
the regional groups (one single rate per region, 
except the case of high intra-regional 
discrepancies). 
Uncertainty If a stochastic approach would be taken, it 
would not be necessary to distinguish 
scenarios and cases as proposed by ENTSO-
E, as all scenarios are randomly generated by 
selecting the value of each parameter 
according to the predefined range and the 
probability distribution. 
We recommend that a sensitivity analysis to 
identify critical parameters be undertaken. In 
addition, we recommend that the distribution 
of net benefit be characterised and quantified 
by some form of stochastic analysis 
ENTSO-E distinguishes between macro-
economic scenarios (which cannot be 
probabilistic because of lack of data), and 
planning scenarios (which may indeed be 
randomly generated). ENTSO-E considers that a 
stochastic approach is not possible for the 
macro-economic scenarios, and that ranges of 
values provide more reliable information to the 
stakeholders. 
Sensitivity analysis is recommended by ENTSO-
E. The extent of and the share of these 








Ranking implies comparing single values. The 
mean value of CBA should be used to 
establish the initial ranking. 
 
ENTSO-E considers that ranking may be carried 
out on the basis of a multi-criteria approach, 
leaving room for bottom-up identification with an 
innovative governance approach, and for 









There is no scientific basis for deciding how to 
do this, and so adjustments of the initial 
ranking due to uncertainty will have to be at 
the discretion of the European Commission. 
However, in to order make this trade off, it is 
necessary that the risk or uncertainty of 
projects is quantified. 
 
 
In this sense ENTSO-E suggests a flexibility 
indicator with a scoring on how the project 






Whenever there are project specific effects 
that are significant enough to impact on the 
overall rank of the project, these should be 
monetized and included into the CBA net 
benefit calculation. The monetary value of the 
effect is determined by some ad hoc 
procedure and reported in sufficient detail that 
it is possible to evaluate the analysis. 
ENTSO-E considers that ad hoc monetisation 
processes are not robust enough. ENTSO-E 
suggests a multi-criteria approach quantifying 
additional indicators in a consistent way, when 
this is possible. Otherwise the quantification may 
be achieved through a common scoring system. 
Both of the methods deliver consistent and robust 











Considering that the relevant distributional 
concerns have been addressed by the quotas 
defined for the elaboration of the list of 
Projects of Common Interest, additional 








If the TOOT approach is used to calculate net 
benefit, there is no need for an ex-post 
evaluation, since the negative interactions 






The use of CBA for cost allocation does not 
bring additional complication on CBA as this 
level of detail is already required in the 
baseline definition. The only requirement 
would be that the output shall be 




The impact of any project in a meshed network 
normally reaches across a large number of 
member states. A rigid use of the split of CBA per 
Member State implies that every TSO within a 
meshed network could potentially get involved in 
the cost allocation process. This increase of 
participants in the process would complicate 
rather than simplify the negotiations associated 




 in its delivery. Moreover, one should pay 
attention to the identified risks of double 
accounting; to the higher volatility of results with 
regard to changes in assumptions and to second-
order effects (tax policies, ownership of 
generators and consumers). 
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